America's New Frontier
A tale of National Divorce and Transatlantic Relations
In Part I, we discussed the growing estrangement between Europe and modern America, a divergence exacerbated by the Trump administration and deeper demographic, economic, and political shifts. These changes have amplified the influence of the South and West - particularly the Sunbelt - at the expense of the traditional power centres of the Northeast and Great Lakes regions. This "de-Yankeefication" of the United States is reshaping the US not only politically and economically but also culturally and ideologically.
One of the most striking transformations is in the realm of religion. Charismatic evangelical movements have attained a form of Gramscian cultural hegemony, dominating rhetoric, language, and style at the expense of traditional, apostolic churches. Economically, the rise of new elites in California, Florida, and Texas is driving an aggressive agenda of union-busting legislation, sweeping tax cuts for the wealthy, and deregulation in both technology and environmental policy. These elites promote a narrative that any form of regulation is inherently harmful and any taxation amounts to theft. Simultaneously, they seek to discredit the civil service, portraying it as a bastion of corruption and moral decay, with the ultimate goal of dismantling it entirely.
The erosion of federal governance aligns with the ideological outlook of many within the Sunbelt elite. Some are motivated by the prospect of privatising state functions for profit, while others embrace techno-optimism, believing artificial intelligence can replace traditional government institutions. Regardless of their motivations, the outcome remains the same: weakened antitrust mechanisms, increased industrial and corporate monopolisation, and growing oligarchic control over politics. The checks and balances that once defined American democracy are increasingly under siege. The legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the social democratic policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations are rapidly fading. While some may believe Trump’s vision is a throwback to the 1950s, his administration - alongside figures such as Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, J.D. Vance, and the architects of Project 2025 - is pursuing something far more radical, despite its tactical alliance with ultra-conservative forces.
This shifting political landscape, reinforced by the ascendancy of the South and West, is further dismantling the moderate, communitarian coalition that once held sway in the United States. Since the 1980s and 1990s, rising polarisation and populism have chipped away at bipartisan consensus. The increasing dominance of the South and West, with their distinct cultural and political inclinations, has tilted the balance towards more extreme conservative policies. Simultaneously, the West Coast’s individualism and economic liberalism have fostered an embrace of identity politics, further entrenching polarisation and sidelining class-based economic issues. The trajectory of this transformation is clear: a louder, more confrontational, and lower-trust society, increasingly at ease with minimal public services and environmental protections.
This new American ethos stands in stark contrast to the middle-class values and community-based institutions that flourished in the industrial North between 1930 and 1970. During that era, bipartisanship and moderation were prevalent within both major parties. By contrast, the conservative coalition, rooted in the South and bolstered by Southern Democrats and allied factions, has spent decades undermining the New Deal order, and it is now on the verge of final victory.
However, no political transformation is ever absolute. Significant opposition remains. Many Americans - both within the traditional power centres of the North and across the country, including transplants from those regions, reject Trumpism and the broader authoritarian, oligarchic agenda it represents. A substantial constituency continues to support a functioning regulatory state, organised labour, social welfare programmes, and the rule of law. Yet, these values are now under relentless assault by an emerging political majority that fuses Christian evangelical supremacy, economic protectionism, fiscal and regulatory rollback, disdain for international institutions, and hostility towards the civil service.
Given this context, Europe must extend a hand of friendship to those Americans who remain committed to the values of the old liberal order. European governments, particularly the United Kingdom, France and Germany, should consider offering roles and safe haven to high-ranking U.S. officials and civil servants who are being marginalised or expelled under the new Trump administration. These individuals, possessing critical expertise in public policy, international development, healthcare, and governance, should be actively recruited before they are absorbed into the corporate sector and lost to public service forever. The European Union already has mechanisms to employ non-EU citizens, and special selection programmes should be established to attract experienced U.S. civil servants. Even if not directly employed by the EU, their skills and institutional knowledge should be harnessed by European think tanks, NGOs, lobbying organisations, trade associations, universities, and national governments. This influx of talent could help Europe enhance its own governance capabilities and refine its approach to statecraft and policy innovation.
A concerted pan-European effort should be launched to attract individuals derisively labelled as the "Swamp" by MAGA-aligned forces. These professionals, spanning think tanks, trade associations, special interest groups, NGOs, advocacy organisations, and legal and lobbying firms with ties to centrist Democrats and moderate Republicans should be encouraged to establish a presence in Brussels and other European capitals. The goal should be to recreate key aspects of Washington D.C.'s institutional dynamics in exile, fostering a European-based network of American governance expertise.
Ultimately, Europe must recognise that the struggle unfolding in the United States is not merely an internal American conflict. It has profound implications for global democracy, governance, and international alliances. By providing refuge and employment to those who continue to champion the principles of the old liberal order in the US, Europe can play a crucial role in preserving and adapting these values for a changing world.
This need not take the form of a government in exile, as Trump legitimately won the last election, and such a move would be both provocative and counterproductive. Rather, it should acknowledge the fait accompli: that American centrist small ‘l’ liberalism is in its twilight, and the people, regions, institutions, and values that once upheld it are in retreat, being supplanted by a new America with different priorities and interests. A retreat to Europe by key mainstream American policymakers, opinion leaders, or institutions would merely reflect the reality that these entities are less effective operating from within the United States and that they may be better positioned to advance their agenda from Europe. In some cases, remaining in the U.S. could even prove counterproductive or harmful, as the legal, political, and financial environment becomes increasingly hostile under the forces Trump has unleashed upon the constitutional architecture of the country. Relocating to Europe, or at least establishing a stronger presence there, while de-Americanising themselves, might prove operationally advantageous for these bodies. The European policy ecosystem should take all necessary steps to facilitate this transition, perhaps even encouraging a transplant of institutions, of say the Brookings Institution, to European soil.
However, this need not begin with institutions; the movement of key individuals could catalyse the process. Prominent figures with ties to past U.S. administrations and strong European connections, such as Russia expert Fiona Hill, are already contributing to the UK’s most recent defence review and features on Patel’s enemy list. Others, like Samantha Power, could be encouraged to join. This initiative should extend to all former members of the U.S. civil service and policy staffers with relevant experience. Europe must also set aside the kind of histrionic reactions witnessed during the hiring of Fiona Scott Morton and instead facilitate this process. To coordinate these efforts from a communications perspective, European institutions should ‘recruit’ prominent Americans who care about Europe, drawing on the expertise of figures such as Anne Applebaum, Jason Pack, Alexandra Hall Hall, Timothy Snyder, Bill Browder (no longer a citizen), and academics like Philip P. O’Brien, among others.
Yet, this exodus should not be confined to policymakers and analysts alone. MAGA has not merely declared war on the so-called 'Swamp'; JD Vance recently declared that professors are the enemy. This is likely driven by the notion, if not outright conspiracy theory, that cultural Marxism has infiltrated academia. If political pressure in the U.S. becomes overwhelming, restrictions on campus protests too draconian, or academic grants, funding, and tenure are revoked under the influence of increasingly politicised faculties and academic boards, then American academics and administrators who find themselves at odds with this new reality should be encouraged to relocate to Europe. A dedicated EU ‘Benjamin Franklin Fund’ could be established to support American academic talent in Europe. While it may prove challenging to attract STEM researchers, this fund could absorb displaced researchers and scientists affected by layoffs instigated by figures like Musk and RFK.
Given the innate patriotism of American troops, persuading them to change allegiance and serve in the defence of Europe might be ambitious. However, there exist sizeable contingents of U.S. military personnel and veterans with combat experience or prior deployments in Europe. A fraction of these, under the right conditions, could be enticed to enlist under a European banner, whether due to their disillusionment with figures like Pete Hegseth, outrage over the betrayal of transatlantic alliances, or deep concerns over the erosion of democratic norms. A committed transatlanticist such as former U.S. commander Ben Hodges, or some of the generals now being purged, could potentially inspire American soldiers to serve a new flag. European nations could collectively finance an expanded French Foreign Legion, the only European military body that permits the recruitment of non-EU citizens and offers a swift pathway to EU citizenship (two years). This force could lay the groundwork for a future EU army composed of U.S.-trained personnel devoted to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
Other vulnerable groups include teachers and public education officials, particularly as the Department of Education faces likely dismantling. Teaching remains one of the most unionised professions in the U.S., and the sector has previously witnessed significant unrest, providing fertile ground for future confrontation with a new administration. Just as with academics, teachers should be encouraged to move to Europe and contribute to the development of its educational landscape, particularly in regions where English proficiency is relatively low, such as Spain and Italy. EU funds could be allocated to supplement their salaries, mitigating disparities with US national teaching wages. A similar strategy could be applied to attract researchers to national European universities.
Another target of Trump’s hostility is the mainline Protestant churches, such as the Episcopalians and Lutherans, who have recently faced the ire of MAGA Republicans. This hostility is largely driven by fundamentalist evangelical animus towards more traditional and moderate denominations, with whom they have historically maintained a complex relationship. While the Catholic right has played a pivotal role in convening the religious right in the U.S., fundamentalist televangelists with libertarian economic leanings and prosperity gospel teachings appear increasingly dominant in this ideological marketplace, elevating Trump and the American flag above any traditional Catholic values. Catholic charities, too, have not been spared from the onslaught unleashed upon federal funding programs under the DOGE agenda.
Western Europeans may instinctively recoil at the idea of churches playing a role in public services, welfare, and the economy. However, it must be acknowledged that religious institutions can contribute positively to social welfare and community initiatives through their charitable endeavours. The European Union and national governments should invite American churches facing political in the U.S. to invest their resources in economic and social projects in Europe, offering special subsidies and tax exemptions to facilitate this transition. Their expertise could be leveraged to establish and Baptist-run or Presbyterian-led libraries, hospitals, and educational institutions, particularly in depopulating peripheral regions or areas with scarce services. Such efforts could even extend to the creation of seminaries and entire educational institutions, as exemplified by the legacy of American missionaries in the 19th century, such as the Anatolian College in Merzifon. These initiatives would revive the evangelistic and ecumenical spirit that produced figures like H. Baskerville in Iran, or the Congregationalist missions to Bulgaria during its national revival.
A renewed American missionary, educational, and charitable movement in Europe could also align with the work of European churches, such as the Church of England or the Church of Sweden. Furthermore, pastors from evangelical or theologically conservative denominations, who have been ostracised for criticising aspects of Trumpism, could also contribute to this effort. Figures such as Tim Alberta have documented the plight of these internal church exiles. Similarly, Catholic clergy disillusioned by the trajectory of lived American Catholicism, the rise of evangelical hegemony, and attacks on Catholic social teaching may also be drawn to such an endeavour. Even the Mormon community, long loyal to the Republican Party yet historically targeted by evangelicals, could reconsider its position in light of intensifying religious tensions. In the face of a hostile American state, some Mormons may revive their pioneering spirit, seeking to rebuild Salt Lake City in a more welcoming environment, bringing with them their financial resources and organisational nous.
A less obvious, yet equally deserving, group for European support is American farmers, particularly those operating small, struggling family farms in the Northeast, the Upland South, and the Midwest. These farmers are less competitive against the industrial-scale agriculture of Texas, California, and Florida, as well as the vast ranches of the West and the former plantation lands of the Deep South. Many employ rotational, diversified farming methods more akin to European practices, suited to poorer soils and cooler climates. While some may remain staunch Trump supporters, they are unlikely to benefit from deregulation, the dismantling of federal agricultural support, and potential trade wars. Such policies will accelerate the decline of the American family farm, already under siege since the 1970s and 1980s, further concentrating land in the hands of corporate agribusiness and venture capitalists. Where will these dispossessed farmers, once the backbone of Jeffersonian democracy and agrarian movements, turn to once their land is seized by tech oligarchs? Particularly those with democratic leanings or who decisively reject Trumpism. One proposal would be to offer grants and subsidies to support independent US farmers struggling to sell in the United States and wishing to invest in land in Europe, or potentially to support the establishment of cooperatives, particularly in Europe’s depopulating rural regions. Such farmers could benefit from EU agricultural subsidies (especially if they are willing to farm organically) and pre-accession funds in countries yet to join the EU. This initiative could facilitate the creation of farming communities across Europe that preserve Jeffersonian ideals while contributing to rural and local development. It might also revive certain aspects of local democracy in rural America - particularly in New England’s town hall democracy or the progressive populism of the Midwest. These communities could be bolstered by like-minded members of the organised labour movement, including factory, artisanal, and service workers who are likely to be affected by the anti-union environment emerging in the United States as Project 2025 unfolds. Labour activists should be formally supported in their potential relocation by the European labour movement.
To be clear, many elements of old, democratic, and civic America, such as its federal institutions, labour movement, yeoman farmers, and educational and church organisations, have been in inexorable decline since at least the 1970s. Europe’s task is not to recreate these institutions ex novo but to salvage what remains for its own enlightened self-interest, adapting them to an environment where they can continue to live on. The integration of these communities and their institutions into Europe may introduce an Anglo-American influence into the European integration process, but this would merely be one element in the rich tapestry of Europe’s diversity, not an imposition of American norms. Europe should thus embrace a strategy of extracting the best aspects of the United States and using them to enrich Europe, some of which are currently being discarded by the current US administration. Ultimately, one man’s trash is another’s treasure. For Americans who continue to hold dear the values of liberal democracy, international cooperation, transatlanticism, and collective self-interest, this migration should not be seen as exile but rather as the realisation of John F. Kennedy’s ‘New Frontier’ in a place where these ideals can once again thrive. Perhaps the America of old could not conquer its frontier, and as the nation consolidated, it became something else. Yet, it might be in Europe that the "city upon a hill" can ultimately be rebuilt, with the old world finally coming to the aid of the new.
However, for this vision to become reality, Europe must address certain obstacles in the hiring of US citizens, which should not be misconstrued as rewarding the Trump administration. The European Commission, along with EU member states committed to building European autonomy, should work in concert to create fiscal incentives that make pursuing a career in Europe more attractive to experienced US professionals. This should be a coordinated pan-European effort, involving EU institutions and committed national governments. Similar tax incentives could be offered to companies employing experienced US workers, while facilitating access to EU Blue Cards for US citizens. The visa regime should also be streamlined for US investors, digital nomads, and workers in the media or creative industries, especially as they may face political pressures and disruptions in the United States related to artificial intelligence. Moreover, US citizens residing in Europe should find it far easier to establish companies, perhaps under a 28th legal framework for startups and scale-ups, thus enabling them to participate fully in an enhanced single market.
European countries should also increase their outreach to their diaspora communities in the United States, funding schools, independent media, community centres, language education, and cultural institutions that help rebuild a positive national consciousness among Americans of European descent. This outreach would afford Dutch-Americans or Swedish-Americans access to top-tier, state-funded education, similar to that available to their European cousins. On spiritual matters, if mainline Protestant churches and some Catholic dioceses in the US struggle to recruit clergy, it would be in their interest to receive vicars, pastors, and priests from Europe, helping to maintain these communities with a stronger European character, in line with the local US demographic.
The creation of cultural, religious, and educational institutions should be viewed as essential in helping these American diasporas reaffirm their ties to their ancestral homelands. This effort should be supported by a coordinated European strategy to facilitate easier access to ancestral citizenship for the members of their American diaspora, and operate much like a "law of return". Willing European states could set up financial assistance and language programmes to assist US immigrants under these laws, following the model of Israel’s Sal Klita and Ulpan programmes, while offering further incentives such as tax breaks similar to those provided by Italy for highly skilled emigrants. For countries with limited fiscal capacity, additional EU funding could be offered to support these policies.
To those who might object to offering preferential treatment to Americans or fear the ‘Americanisation’ of Europe, I would argue that Europe may need these Americans. Moreover, Americans have other options to relocate to. Nevertheless, there is still enough goodwill in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where a genuine affection for America and its founding values endures to make this coordinated, welcoming policy a reality. Ultimately, what is there to object to in the America of FDR or John F. Kennedy? Ironically, this influx of Americans could serve as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and the United States, as the ‘New America’ comes to terms with the ‘Old European America’ in the aftermath of their national divorce.
Finally, though I hope it never comes to this, should Trump or his successors succeed in turning Canada into the 51st state, an alarming prospect, the number of American exiles could be bolstered by a Canadian contingent. European policies benefiting US immigrants should extend to these Canadian émigrés as well, and there may even be an opportunity to support a Canadian government in exile, which could include prominent figures such as British-Irish Mark Carney or Ukrainian-speaking Chrystia Freeland, who could assist these exiles in Europe and further preserve the soul of Anglo-America in its new home.